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and even hinted at a possible endorsement for his reelection in 2004 (Murray). The UMWA has praised the 
president's energy policy, particularly his promotion of increased coal production. Other unions have 
reached comparable accommodations, but these two unions are particularly noteworthy because they 
have been strong supporters of John Sweeney. 
Tie to these political defections the departure from the AFL-CIO of the Carpenters union in March 2001, 
and it appears that labor is moving dangerously towards fragmentation. On the other hand there are 
definite signs of strength in the political and organizing arenas, and unionization in the public sector 
remains strong with density over 38%. The story of labor's efforts at renewal is clearly unfinished. The 
dinosaur has been more active in the Sweeney era, but membership overall continues to dwindle and 
there are indications of trouble on the horizon. The struggle continues, and in spite of growing skepticism, 
extinction is not inevitable. 
Keywords 
labor movement, organizing, union, worker rights, unionization, politics 
Disciplines 
American Politics | Collective Bargaining | Unions 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Hurd, R. W. (2002). Contesting the dinosaur image: The labor movement’s search for a future. [Electronic 
version]. Retrieved [insert date] from Cornell University, ILR school site: 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/299/ 
Required Publisher Statement 
Reprinted with permission of South African Sociological Association. Final version published as Hurd, R. 
W. (2002). Contesting the dinosaur image: The labor movement’s search for a future. Society in transition, 
33(2), 227-240. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/299 
Contesting the Dinosaur Image -
Th e L abor M ov em en t ’ s Sear ch f or a Fu t u r e 
Richard W. Hurd 
Professor and Director of Labor Studies 
N ew York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations 
Cornell University 
I thaca, N ew Yor k 
Updated and con d en sed v er si on 
of a paper published under the same title 
in L abor Studies Journal, V ol . 22, N o. 4, 1998 
Historical Foundation: the Servicing Model of Unionism 
Fi f t y y ear s ago u n d er v er y d i f f er en t ci r cu m st an ces, U .S. u n i on l ead er s m ad e 
choi ces t hat shaped union strategy for the next half century. The Great Depression and 
W or l d W ar I I had p r ov i d ed t he back d r op f or r ap i d u ni on gr ow t h. D u r i ng t he 1930’ s 
workers’ passivity gave w ay to militance and collective action as they flocked to the 
industrial unions of the renegade Congress of Industrial Organizations. Union 
expansion w as aided by a friendly federal government, which facilitated union 
or gan i zat i on w i t h t h e W agn er A ct of 1935 an d t h en p r om ot ed col l ect i v e bar gai n i n g 
during the War to assure indust r i al p eace. I n t he t en y ear s f r om 1935 t o 1945, u ni on 
m em ber shi p exp l od ed f r om t hr ee m i l l i on t o ov er f ou r t een m i l l i on, f r om 13.2% of t he 
w or k f or ce t o 35.5% (U .S. D ep ar t m ent of Com m er ce 1975:178). 
I n r eact i on , em p l oy er s sou g h t w ay s t o r est r i ct u n i on s and to stabilize relations in 
order to reclaim authority in the workplace. A central part of this initiative w as a 
political campaign which contributed to the election of a Republican Congress in 1946 
and then culminated in the enactment of the Taft-H ar t l ey A ct i n 1947. The Taf t -H ar t l ey 
amendments to the Wagner A ct placed strict limits on workers’ organizing rights, on 
strikes and other forms of direct action, and on unions’ mutual aid tactics, while 
enhancing the role of collective bargaining in part by buttressing the legal status of 
n eg ot i at ed ag r eem en t s. 
The external environment helped shape and support the response of unions. 
A f t er W or l d W ar I I , t he U .S. ent er ed a p r ol onged p er i od of p r osp er i t y cond u ci v e t o 
stability and bargaining pow er for unions w i l l i ng to f ocus on the economi c concer ns of 
their members. Operating from a position of much greater strength than in the past, 
unions retained the job-consciousness which had dominated this country’s labor 
movement throughout most of its history. This f o cu s n o t o n l y m ad e sen se i n a p er i o d 
of prosperity, it al so melded w ith the stability objectives of employers. Long-t er m 
col l ect i v e bar gai ni ng agr eem ent s sp el l i ng ou t t he d et ai l s of t he em p l oy m ent 
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relationship became the norm. This rule-b ased sy st em w o rked for employers in part 
b ecau se st at e-of-the art production management relied on industrial engineering to 
incorporate contract specifications into the scientific d esign of the workplace. 
Em p l oy er s t h er eby af f i r m ed t h ei r au t h or i t y t o m ak e d eci si on s r egarding the 
organization of work, while unions retained the right to negotiate contractual 
limitations and protections for members. 
The national union evolved into a service organization. The detailed rule-b a sed 
n at u r e of ag r eem en t s com b i n ed w i t h t h e i n creasingly legalistic grievance and 
arbitration system to enhance the importance of full-t i m e u n i o n st af f w h o d ev el o p ed 
ex p er t i se i n t h ese f u n ct i on s. A l t h ou gh som e obser v er s r ai sed qu est i on s abou t t h e 
elitism of national union officials and/ or the metamorp h osi s of u n i on s i n t o b u si n ess 
or gan i za t i on s, by an d l ar ge t h e bu r eau cr at i c sy st em w as ef f ect i v e at d el i v er i n g w h at t h e 
members wanted: steadily improving economic rewards and protection from arbitrary 
treatment on the job. 
W i t h t h e m er ger of t h e A FL an d t h e CI O i n 1955, t h e k ey p i eces of t h e l abor 
m ov em ent ’ s ad m i ni st r at i v e p u zzl e w er e i n p l ace. By 1955 u ni ons w er e f i r m l y 
committed to an approach that has come to be known as the "servicing model" (AFL-
CI O, 1988:6). Th e el ect ed of f i ci al s an d f i el d st af f of national unions w ould focus on 
collective bargaining and contract enforcement. The AFL-CIO would coordinate 
political activity. The labor bureaucracy would concentrate on supporting these 
functions as efficiently as possible. Under the servicing model, act i v e i n v ol v em en t of 
t h e m em ber s w ou l d n ot be n ecessar y . M i ssi n g f r om t h i s f r am ew or k w as an y cl ear 
conception of how organizi ng w ould fit. For tw enty-f i v e y ear s af t er m er g er , u n i o n 
m em b er sh i p con t i n u ed t o i n cr ease, b u t at a r at e i n su f f i ci en t t o k eep u p with the growth 
of the labor force. 
T h e D ecl i n e of Or gan i zed L abor 
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By t h e 1955 m er ger , u n i on m em ber sh i p h ad gr ow n t o sev en t een m i l l i on , bu t t h e 
share of the labor force had fallen slightly to 33%. The labor movement continued to 
ex p an d at a sl ow p ace, peaking at just over tw enty-t h r ee m i l l i on i n t h e ear l y 1970’ s an d 
staying at that level through 1980. However, the unions’ share of the workforce 
ex h i bi t ed a sl ow d ecl i n e ov er t h e sam e p er i od , d r op p i n g bel ow t h i r t y p er cen t i n 1962 
and st and i ng at twenty-tw o p er cent i n 1980 (U .S. D ep ar t m ent of Com m er ce 1975:178; 
1982:409). Th i s sl i p p age w ou l d h av e been gr eat er ex cep t f or t h e st ead y gr ow t h of 
p u bl i c sect or u n i on i zat i on d u r i n g t h e 1960’ s an d ‘ 70s. 
T h e p ace of d ecl i n e accel er at ed af t er 1980 as u n i on s su f f er ed an absol u t e 
m em ber sh i p l oss of n ear l y t w en t y -f i v e p er cen t ov er t h e n ex t f i v e y ear s. A l t h ou gh t h e 
losses then slowed dramatically, the share of the workforce belonging to unions 
continued to slip. In 1995 union membership w as 16.4 million, representing 14.9 
p er cen t of n on -agr i cu l t u r al em p l oy ees, bu t on l y 10.4 p er cen t of p r i v at e sect or w or k er s 
(Bu r eau of N at i on al A f f ai r s, 1996a). Tod ay u n i on s h av e abou t as m an y m em ber s as i n 
1950, bu t r ep r esen t on l y 9 p er cen t of t h e p r i v at e sect or w or k f or ce, a l ow er sh ar e than in 
1930 bef or e t h e gr eat ex p an si on associ at ed w i t h t h e CI O an d t h e W agn er A ct . A r ev i ew 
of t he m or e p r om i nent exp l anat i ons of t he d ecl i ne shou l d p u t i nt o p er sp ect i v e t he 
ex t r aor d i n ar y ch al l en ge f aced by t h e l abor m ov em en t . 
T h e t w i n r ecessi on s of 1980 and 1981-82 u sh er ed i n a p er i od of con cessi on s b y 
unions. Once concessionary bargaining had taken hold, it proved difficult for unions to 
h al t t h e t r en d becau se of p er si st en t econ om i c p r essu r es. M ost i m p or t an t w as t h e ar r i v al 
of the global economy, as t h e sh ar e of i m p or t s i n cr eased i n a b r oad r an g e of m ar k et s. 
The process w as aided by trade liberalization promoted by both Republican and 
Democratic administrations. The external threat hastened shifts in the domestic 
econom y as m anu f act u r i ng f i r m s abandoned old factories in the unionized "rust belt" 
for new facilities in the non-uni on "sun bel t". The backdrop w as a l ong-t er m t r en d i n 
our economy aw ay from production of goods to the production of services. As the 
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number of bl ue-co l l ar m an u f act u r i n g j o bs dw i ndl ed, w hi te-collar employment in the 
ser v i ces ex p an d ed . 
Ev en i n m any u ni oni zed i nd u st r i es w her e em p l oy m ent r em ai ned r el at i v el y 
st abl e, t h er e w er e sea ch an ges t h at w ou l d u p set t h e st at u s qu o an d t h r eat en u n i on s. 
Deregulation, first of airlines and trucking, then of telecommunication, and more 
r ecen t l y of t h e u t i l i t i es, p av ed t h e w ay f or t h e en t r y of n on -union competitors which 
t ook bu si n ess aw ay f r om est abl i sh ed f i r m s an d r ei n f or ced p r essu r es f or con cessi on ar y 
bargaining. Unionized w orkers w ere increasingly concentrated in old plants, firms, 
and industries, that had a difficult time competing in the deregulated global economy. 
Th er e w er e ot h er f act or s at w or k i n ad d i t i on t o econ om i c f or ces. I n t h e 1970s, 
w ith unions alread y on the d ecline in the p r i v at e sect o r , em p l o y er s’ st r at eg i es o f 
resistance to unions became more sophisticated. In addition, open violations of the law 
i n cr eased d r am at i cal l y an d by 1980 t h e p r act i ce of f i r i n g u n i on su p p or t er s t o h al t 
organizing momentum w as commonplace (Weiler , 1991). 
The full anti-union potential of the Taft-H ar t l ey am en d m en t s w as r eal i ze d af t er 
Pr esi d en t Reagan br ok e w i t h h i s p r ed ecessor s an d ap p oi n t ed t o t h e N at i on al L abor 
Relations Board (NLRB) management lawyers who were openly hostile to unionization. 
A s t h e Reagan N L RB l en t a sy m p at h et i c ear , em p l oy er s w er e em bol d en ed an d 
acrimony during organizing drives reached new heights. Disregard for the law 
continued, but re-i n t er p r et at i on of t h e l aw w as m or e i m p or t an t b ecau se i t ex p an d ed t h e 
l egal l y accep t abl e an t i -u n i on t act i cs av ai l abl e t o em p l oy er s (H u r d , 1994). 
The Reagan NLRB’s decisions contributed to the decline of unions in the 
bar gai n i n g ar en a as w el l . I n essen ce, t h e em p l oy er ’ s d u t y t o bar gai n i n good f ai t h w as 
r ei n t er p r et ed t o b e a d u t y t o m eet f or the purpose of bargaining. This and related 
changes allowed employers to avoid first contracts without committing unfair labor 
p r act i ces ( H u r d , 1996) . T h ey al so f aci l i t at ed t h e em p l oy er s’ u n i on -elimination strategy 
of har d bar gai ni ng t o f or ce a st r i k e and then hiring "permanent replacements" for 
striking workers. 
4 
Th e i m p act of t h e Reagan N L RB w ou l d h av e been m od est h ad em p l oy er s n ot 
been poised to take advantage of this opportunity to w eaken unions. As Kochan, Katz 
and McKersie remind us: "In choosing how to respond to both new business 
op p or t u n i t i es an d / or t h e n eed t o l ow er cost s, t h e d eep -seat ed p r ef er en ce of A m er i can 
em p l oy er s f or op er at i n g w i t h ou t a u n i on d om i n at ed m an ager i al ch oi ces, ex cep t w h er e 
pre-existing high levels of unionization constrain ed t h i s o p t i o n ( K o ch an , et al , 1994: 12) . 
Two models of union avoidance unfolded. The "union substitution" model 
r el i ed on t h e p r ogr essi v e t ech n i qu es of h u m an r esou r ce m an agem en t (H RM ) t o of f er 
workers some modicum of voice and an arguably more desirable work environment 
than existed in many unionized facilities. The "union suppression" model relied on 
ag g r essi v e an t i -u n i on i sm esp eci al l y d u r i n g or gan i zi n g cam p ai gn s (K au f m an , 1993:142). 
By 1980 u n i on i zed com p an i es t h at w i sh ed t o escap e h ad begu n t o ad op t t h ese t w o 
options first developed by non-union firms. 
Th e econ om i c p r essu r es t h at p eak ed i n t h e 1980’ s p r ov i d ed t h e m ot i v e f or 
unionized firms to change. Some chose to work with unions to modify the production 
system, adapting H RM techniques to the unionized setting. Others sought to impose 
new production systems either unilaterally, or during the concessionary bargaining of 
the period. Many followed the "greenfield" strategy, gradually replacing old unionized 
facilities and their rule based production w i th new non-union facilities organized along 
t h e l i n es of t h e H RM m od el . A n d a f ew f i r m s j oi n ed t h ei r n on -union counterparts to 
t ak e ad v ant age of t he f r i end l y N L RB and op enl y at t ack ed u ni ons t o el i m i nat e w hat 
t h ey p er cei v ed as " t h e p r ob l em ." T h e p r ed ominant pattern w as for employers to 
t ol er at e u n i on s w h er e t h ey w er e est abl i sh ed , bu t t o t ak e w h at ev er st ep s n ecessar y t o 
assu r e t h at ex i st i n g n o n -union facilities and al l new facilities operated w ithout unions. 
Unions carried w ith them tw o hidden liabilities. First, the focus on collective 
bar gai n i n g an d t h e gr i ev an ce an d ar bi t r at i on sy st em h ad p r od u ced r i gi d r u l e based 
contracts, which created problems during an era when firms sought flexibility in order 
t o r eact m or e qu i ck l y t o econ om i c ch an ge. Th i s si t u at i on w as ex acer bat ed as u n i on s 
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r esi st ed p r op osal s t o m ov e t ow ar d s t h e H RM based sy st em s of w or k or gan i za t i on . Th e 
secon d l i abi l i t y w as t h e r el i an ce on t h e ser v i ci n g m od el an d con sequ en t n egl ect of t h e 
organizing function. A lthough inertia had assured natural membership grow th early 
i n t h e p ost W or l d W ar I I p er i od , by 1980 t h at m om en t u m w as gon e, at l east i n t h e 
p r i v at e sect or . The l ow l ev el of or gani zi ng f u r t her com p l i cat ed t he p r obl em s f or 
u n i on s, w h i ch n eed ed n ew m em b er s t o cou n t er act t h e l oss of u nionized jobs in many 
i nd u st r i es. 
Th e r el i an ce on t h e ser v i ci n g m od el al so m ay h av e con t r i bu t ed t o l abor ’ s 
p r obl em s i n a m or e su bt l e w ay . Ov er t i m e, t h i s st r at egi c ap p r oach d ead en ed t h e 
activism and commitment of members. As workers who participated in t h e ex ci t em en t 
associ at ed w i t h t h e h ey d ay of t h e CI O m ov ed on an d r et i r ed , t h ey w er e r ep l aced by 
others w ith no connection to organizing or to labor as a movement. They tended to 
view the union as a third party and to accept uncritically the expertise of the union 
representative in arbitrations and bargaining. The passivity of members which evolved 
sh ou l d com e as n o su r p r i se si n ce u n d er t h e ser v i ci n g m od el t h e n er v e of p er son al 
i n v ol v em en t h ad been sev er ed l on g ago. 
T h e St r at egi c Resp on se t o Cr i si s i n t h e Kirkland Era 
W h en l abor l ead er s i n t h e 1980s f aced t h e t r i p l e t h r eat of econ om i c r est r u ct u r i n g, 
the Reagan administration, and increasing employer hostility, they were stymied. As 
m em ber sh i p an d r ev en u es p l u m m et ed , n at i on al u n i on s scr am bl ed t o k eep t h ei r h ead s 
abov e w at er . I n t h e ear l y 1980s, ser i ou s con si d er at i on of an y d r am at i c sh i f t i n st r at egy 
w as out of the question for most unions as concern for institutional preservation 
prevailed. The difficulty in r esponding decisively can be traced in part to t h e 
symbiosis between the union bureaucracy and the internal political concerns of unions 
l eaders. Because union officers at al l levels must stand for el ection periodically, a 
p r em i u m i s p l aced on sat i sf y i n g m em ber s. Th e ser v i ci n g m od el h ad d on e t h at f or 
y ear s. A l so, m ost el ect ed l ead er s h ad r i sen t o t h ei r p osi t i on s based on ex p er i en ce 
6 
gained within the context of this model. Similarly, the experts who staffed the union 
bu r eau cr acy h ad gai n ed t h ei r p osi t i on s becau se of com p et en ce i n f u n ct i on s r el at ed to 
servicing. Rather than considering serious change, the tendency for l eaders and staff 
from Kirkland on down w as to blame failures on external forces, to justify policies by 
past successes, and to avoid the difficult question of strategic transformation ( L aw l er , 
1990:48-49). 
In spite of this ingrained institutional rigidity, the external threat w as so great 
t h at m an y l ead er s of n at i on al u n i on s began t o sear ch t en t at i v el y f or a w ay ou t of t h ei r 
p r ed i cam en t . I n 1982, i n f or m al d i scu ssi on s gav e w ay t o f or m al act i on . Th e A FL -CIO 
Execu t i v e Cou nci l f or m ed t he Com m i t t ee on t he Ev ol u t i on of W or k . U nd er t he 
chairmanship of AFL-CI O Secr et ar y T r easu r er T om D on ah u e, t h i s com m i t t ee p r ov i d ed 
a forum for union presidents to consider the challenges and choices they faced . The 
Changi ng Si tuati on of Workers and Thei r Uni ons (A FL -CI O, 1985b), t h e r ep or t i ssu ed 
by the committee in 1985, officially encouraged unions to experiment with new tactics 
an d st r at eg i es. 
A l though l abor may be faul ted for a sl ow and/ or i ncompl ete resp o n se, i n f act 
most unions eventually altered or at l east fine-t u n ed t h ei r st r at eg i es. Few m ad e t h e 
ch oi ce m er el y t o p r eser v e t h e st at u s qu o. Con si st en t w i t h t h e r ecom m en d at i on s of The 
Changing Situation, a v ar i et y of cou r ses w er e f ol l ow ed . 
1. Improvem en t s i n A d m i n i st r at i v e St r u ct u r e an d Ser v i ce D el i v er y : Faced w i t h 
tight budgets, many national unions launched initiatives to improve administrative 
ef f i ci en cy . Th e A FL -CI O’ s Geor ge M ean y Cen t er d ev el op ed a p r ogr am f or t r ad e u n i on 
ad m i ni st r at or s and i nd ividual unions increased support for staff training. The search 
for administrative efficiency during a period of declining membership precipitated 
numerous mergers and affiliations. Unions began to engage in strategic planning, 
many for the first time. 
In an effort to enhance labor’s public image, the A FL-CIO introduced a 
marketing campaign with the theme, "Union Yes." In addition, the AFL-CIO 
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est abl i sh ed t h e U n i on Pr i v i l ege Ben ef i t s p r ogr am , w h i ch of f er ed d i r ect , ben ef i t s su ch as 
l ow i n t er est cr ed i t car d s t o m em ber s of af f i l i at ed u n i on s. W i t h t h e en cou r agem en t of 
t h e A FL -CI O, sev er al u n i on s est abl i sh ed a n ew cat egor y of " associ at e m em ber s," w h o 
cou l d t ak e ad v an t age of t h e ben ef i t s of f er ed by U n i on Pr i v i l ege an d be n on -voting 
m em ber s of t he u ni on ev en t hou gh t hey w er e not em p l oy ed i n a u ni oni zed w or k p l ace. 
Th ese ad m i n i st r at i v e ch an ges i m p r ov ed t h e ef f ect i v en ess of u n i on s i n som e 
w ay s, bu t n on e of t h em ch al l en ged t h e p r ev ai l i n g ser v i ci n g m od el . M er ger s sel d om 
fulfilled their potential because concern for the logistics of bureaucratic integration 
ov er sh ad ow ed st r at eg i c con si d er at i on s. Ev en st r at egi c p l anni ng, as p r act i ced by m ost 
unions, w as limited to more clearly defining objectives rather than challenging those 
ob j ect i v es. 
2. Political Action: Ron al d Reag an ser v ed as a co n v en i en t t ar g et b ecau se o f h i s 
open hosti l i ty to uni ons. Si nce the A FL-CIO’s leadership role is most clearly evident in 
the political arena, it is not surprising that the quest for a political solution to labor’s 
pl i ght proved to be irresistible. The attraction w as particularly strong because unions 
h ad n ear l y su cceed ed i n secu r i n g l abor l aw r ef or m i n 1978 d u r i n g t h e ad m i n i st r at i on of 
D em ocr at i c Pr esi d en t Ji m m y Car t er . 
St ar t i n g w i t h t h e en d or sem en t of W al t er M on d al e f or Pr esi d en t i n 1984 prior to 
the Democratic primaries (a break w ith tradition), the A FL-C I O st ay ed t h e co u r se w i t h 
dogged determination. Coordination of campaign contributions to Congressional races 
by the unions’ political action committees became more sophisticated (H urd and Sohl , 
1992), an d t h er e w er e ev en a f ew m od est su ccesses on Cap i t al H i l l l i k e p l an t cl osi n g 
legislation. Finally, in 1992, labor’s patient commitment to a political solution seemed 
to pay off w ith the election of Bill Clinton. The new President promised to deal w ith 
labor’s number one concern: labor law reform. The Commission on the Future of 
Labor Management Relations w as appointed, with John Dunlop serving as chairperson. 
I t w ou l d be d i f f i cu l t t o ov er st at e t he d egr ee of hop e i nsp i r ed i n L ane K i r k l and , t he 
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l eaders of nati onal uni ons, and the A FL-CIO staff by the election of Bill Clinton and the 
subsequent appointment of the Dunlop Commission. 
The labor movement’s heightened reliance on political action may at first appear 
to signal a significant shift in strategy. H ow ever, the focus on lobbying, endorsements, 
and campaign contributions w as well within the traditions of the AFL-CI O and 
consistent with the servicing model. The political solution, however, proved to be 
phantasmi c. A ny chance for significant union-friendly labor law reform w as w iped out 
by t h e col l ap se of t h e D em ocr at i c Con gr ess i n t h e 1994 el ect i on s, t w o m on t h s bef or e t h e 
r el ease of t h e D u n l op Com m i ssi on ’ s r ecom m en d at i on s, w h i ch w er e a m aj or 
disappointment. 
3. N ew Bar g ai n i n g St r at eg i es: A fter initial r esistance to employer-d esi g n ed 
sch em es t o r eor gan i ze w or k , u n i on s ad ap t ed . Th ey con cl u d ed t h at r eor gan i za t i on n eed 
not threaten the union as an institution so long as its role as bargaining agent w as 
p r eser v ed . I n 1994, t he A FL -CIO Committee on the Evolution of Work confirmed the 
shift in labor’s position with the release of a report, The N ew A merican Workpl ace: a 
L abor Per sp ective (A FL -CI O, 1994). Labor’s acceptance of new forms of w ork 
organization w as by no means universal , b u t t h e m aj o r i t y o f l ab o r l ead er s ag r eed t o 
some form of joint decision making as desirable, or at least inevitable. 
The support for labor-m an agem en t p ar t n er sh i p s i s p ar al l el i n m an y w ay s t o t h e 
p ost W or l d W ar I I ex p er i en ce w i t h i n d u st r i al en g i n eer ing. Unions accommodated to 
m an ag em en t ’ s v i ew o f t h e st at e-of-the-ar t i n w or k or gan i zat i on an d ad op t ed n ew 
approaches to bargaining consistent with the new reality. The adaptation of unions to 
em p l oy er i n i t i at i v es t o r eor gan i ze w or k r ep r esen t s a br eak w i th the past to the extent 
t h at t h e r u l e based agr eem en t s of ol d ar e r ep l aced by m or e f l ex i bl e d ocu m en t s. 
N ew bar gai ni ng st r at egi es associ at ed w i t h l abor -management partnerships and 
em p l oy ee i n v ol v em en t p r ogr am s car r y w i t h t h em a t r an sf or m at i on al au r a. Upon 
careful inspection, however, it is cl ear that the transformation is in the superficial 
r el at i onshi p bet w een t he u ni on and t he em p l oy er . V i ew ed f r om t he p er sp ect i v e of t he 
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union, the new relationship can be accommodated without a dramatic change in how it 
d oes bu si n ess. Th e u n i on ’ s r ol e as bar gai n i n g agen t i s p r eser v ed , an d t h e ser v i ci n g 
m od el su r v i v es. 
4. N ew Sou r ces of Pow er : W i t h t h e d ecl i n e i n t h e ef f ect i v en ess of t h e st r i k e, 
many unions focused their attention on developing alternative sources of p ow er . T h e 
m ost w i d el y accep t ed t ech n i qu e cam e t o be k n ow n as t h e " cor p or at e cam p ai gn ." 
Cor p or at e r esear ch i d en t i f i es l en d er s, i n v est or s, cu st om er s, su p p l i er s, st ock h ol d er s, an d 
d i r ect or s w ho m i ght be i nf l u enced t o ap p l y p r essu r e on t he em p l oy er . So m e 
cam p ai gn s r each ou t t o gov er n m en t r egu l at or y agen ci es, el ect ed of f i ci al s, or p ot en t i al 
community allies who might be able to assist. The idea aims to match the union’s 
st r en gt h agai n st t h e em p l oy er ’ s w eak n ess. W h at ev er t h e sou r ce, t h e ex t er n al p r essu r e 
on t h e em p l oy er i n cr eases t h e cost of con t i n u ed r esi st an ce an d t h er eby m ak es 
settlement more attractive. 
Although innovative, corporate campaigns do not necessarily conflict with the 
servicing model. The campaigns can be conducted by the national union’s staff, with a 
p r om i nent r ol e f or t hose w ho ar e exp er t s i n r esear ch and p u bl i c r el at i ons. Ther e i s l i t t l e 
n eed t o i n v ol v e l ocal l ead er s or m em ber s. I n p r act i ce, m ost cor p or at e cam p ai gn s h av e 
been implemented only after traditional bargaining has failed and a traditional strike 
h as col l ap sed or h as b een r ej ect ed b y an ap p r eh en si v e r an k -and -file. 
5. Ren ew ed I n t er est i n O r g an i zi n g : Much of the discussion and 
r ecommendations in The Changi ng Situation d eal t d i r ect l y w i t h so m e asp ect o f 
organizing. How ever, during a period of tight budgets, it w as not easy for unions to 
fund major new initiatives. The importance of organizing w as heralded in conference 
r esol u t i on s, sp eech es, an d u n i on n ew sp ap er s, bu t t h e r h et or i c d i d n ot t r an sl at e r ead i l y 
into action. 
Sy m bol i c of t h e d i f f i cu l t i es en cou n t er ed , t h e cam p ai gn sp on sor ed by t h e A FL -
CIO Executive Council against Blue Cross/ Blue Shield failed. The campaign had been 
i nt r od u ced w i t h gr eat f anf ar e i n A u gu st 1985 by L ane K i r k l and : "The Bl u e Cr oss/ Bl u e 
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Shield campaign is a new organizing model w hich... implements many of the 
recommendations from The Changi ng Situation" (A FL -CI O, 1985a). H ow ev er , m ont hs 
of bu r eau cr at i c d el ay s t ook t h ei r t ol l . By t h e t i m e agr eem en t w as r each ed on w h i ch 
st at e Bl u e Cr oss/ Bl u e Sh i el d p l an s w ou l d be assi gn ed as a t ar get f or each of t h e ei gh t 
participating unions, the company had implemented an effective anti-union program. 
Even without the delays, the campaign might have collapsed on its own since there w as 
n ev er an y ev i d en ce t h at t h e em p l oy ees d esi r ed u n i on r ep r esen t at i on (N or t h r u p , 1990). 
In spite of difficulties and disappointments, the commitment to organizing did 
n ot f ad e. Bu r n ed by t h e Bl u e Cr oss-Bl u e Sh i el d ex p er i en ce, an d u r ged on by m em ber 
unions that were encountering their ow n difficulties in the organizing arena, the AFL-
CIO shifted its approach. In 1989 the Executive Council endorsed the creation of an 
independent entity, the Organizing Institute, "to enhance union organizing and to 
enhance the skills of union organizers." The Organizing Institute (OI) would report 
directly to Tom Donahue and would be funded largely by unions who chose to sponsor 
i t and t ak e ad v ant age of t he t r ai ni ng i t of f er ed . 
By 1995, ov er on e t h ou san d or gan i zer s h ad p ar t i ci p at ed i n i t s i n n ov at i ve training 
program. In addition to training organizers, the Institute aggressively pursued its 
charge "to advance union organizing." The organizing directors of the fifteen 
sp on sor i n g u n i on s m et r egu l ar l y t o d i scu ss t h ei r ex p er i en ces. Th e I n st i t u t e’ s El ect ed 
L ead er Task For ce br ou gh t t oget h er r egi on al d i r ect or s an d p r esi d en t s of l ar ge l ocal s 
w h o h ad d em on st r at ed com m i t m en t an d su ccess i n t h e p u r su i t of aggr essi v e 
or gani zi ng pr ogr ams. Both of these f or ums pr omoted cr oss-cultivation and 
cooperation which has been rare in a labor movement where individual national unions 
tend to be very protective of their internal affairs. In conjunction with the sponsoring 
unions, the OI advanced the position that unions must be seen as vehicles for social and 
economi c j u st i ce i f t h ey h op e t o su r v i v e. 
A l t h ou gh t h e OI cou l d p l ay t h e r ol e of cat al y st , r eal st r at egi c ch an ge can occu r 
only within the national unions. The dozen unions associated with the OI 
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d em on st r at ed r en ew ed com m i t m en t t o or gan i zi n g i n ear l y 1990s t h at cl early 
t r an scen d ed r h et or i c an d su p er f i ci al gest u r es. W i t h aggr essi v e gr assr oot s p r ogr am s 
t h ey l ed an ef f or t t o r eest abl i sh or gan i zi n g as t h e cen t r al t en et of t h e l abor m ov em en t 
an d i n t h e p r ocess st r u ggl ed t o br eak f r ee f r om t h e con st r ai n t s of t h e ser v i cing model. 
Among all of the strategic responses to crisis during the Kirkland era, the shift in focus 
f r om ser v i ci ng t o or gani zi ng of f er ed t he gr eat est p r om i se f or t he f u t u r e. 
Contesting the Dinosaur Image 
I n r ecen t y ear s, f r i en d s o f l ab o r h av e r ai sed p enetrating questions about the 
cu r r en t an d f u t u r e st at e of t h e l abor m ov em en t . For ex am p l e, i n h i s p r ov ocat i v e book 
Which Side Are You On?, Thom as Geoghegan cap t u r ed a p op u l ar i m age of u ni ons w i t h 
his depiction of "...a dumb, stupid mastodon of a thing, craw ling off to Bal H arbour to 
d i e. (Geogh egan , 1992: 37)." A l t h ou gh t h er e w as am p l e basi s f or sk ep t i ci sm at t h e t i m e 
of Geoghegan's observation, the actions by labor in r esponse to crisis during the 
K i r k l an d y ear s, as d escr i b ed , b el i e t h e i m ag e of a d ecr epit beast lumbering off to its 
bu r i al gr ou n d . I n d eed , Bal H ar bou r (t h e Fl or i d a beach r et r eat f av or ed by t h e A FL -CIO 
Executive Council from the 1970s through the mid 90s) w as the site for the unveiling of 
The Changing Situation i n 1985 an d t h e r el ease of Th e N ew American Workplace in 
1994. I t i s i m p or t an t t o r ecogn i ze t h e d ep t h an d br ead t h of l abor ’ s v i gi l an ce as i t 
st r u ggl ed t o w eat h er t h e st or m . To h i s cr ed i t Tom D on ah u e l ed t h e sear ch f or n ew 
st r at eg i es, an d t o h i s cr ed i t L an e K i r k l an d en cou r ag ed t h e effort. Although concerns 
for institutional preservation may have inhibited creativity, the very fact that the AFL-
CIO officially sanctioned the consideration of non-traditional alternatives w as useful. 
However, the maneuvering and modest innovations neith er sol v ed l ab or ’ s p r ob l em s, 
n or set t h e m ov em en t on cou r se f or i n ev i t abl e r en ai ssan ce. 
With the persistent difficulties labor’s image slow ly diminished. Once reviled 
and respected for its political influence and economic power, by 1995 the labor 
movem en t w as w i d el y v i ew ed as an an ach r on i sm . Bei ng H ear d, a 1994 r ep or t 
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p r ep ar ed f or t h e A FL -CI O, u sed su r v ey r esear ch an d f ocu s gr ou p s t o assess p u bl i c 
attitudes towards unions. In essence, the report’s conclusion concurred with 
Geogh egan ’ s obser v at i on , at l east so f ar as l abor ’ s i m age i s con cer n ed : " M ost l y u n i on s 
ar e d i scu ssed as som et h i n g n o l on ger r el ev an t , as sy m bol i zed i n t h e f r equ en t l y u sed 
shorthand ‘They’re dinosaurs.’" (Gr eer , et al , 1994:12). 
The Structural Fix Temptation 
Th e l abor m ov em en t ’ s r esp on se l an gu i sh ed i n p ar t becau se i t w as d r i v en by 
concern for institutional preservation. A ssociate memberships, union credit cards, 
political action, labor-management partnershi ps, and corporate campai gns, though 
i nnovati ve and testaments to l abor’s adaptability, did not challenge the institutional 
inertia which inhibited radical transformation. Labor’s response w as modest by 
d esign. The objective w as to adapt, not to transform. The AFL-CI O and af f i l i at ed 
n at i on al u n i on s sou gh t a p r agm at i c st r u ct u ral fix. 
The primacy afforded to institutional preservation unintentionally contributed to 
l abor ’ s d i n osau r i m age. Th e obj ect i v e of Bei ng H ear d w as t o h el p t h e A FL -CIO 
improve its "strategic communications" in order to improve this unflattering image. 
Th e r esu l t w as a n ew ad v er t i si n g cam p ai gn , u n v ei l ed i n 1995. I n ef f ect , t h e A FL -CIO 
under Lane Kirkland viewed the dinosaur image as a communications challenge. 
The Elusive Organizing M odel 
While the Evolution of Work Committee sought top down answers to unions’ 
p r obl em s, i n som e cor n er s of t h e l abor m ov em en t p r ogr essi v e l ead er s an d st af f 
m em ber s began t o ad v ocat e ch an ge f r om t h e bot t om u p . Th e SEI U i n t h e Contract 
Campaign M anual (SEI U , 1988) and t he CW A i n i t s M obilizing for the ‘90s en cou r ag ed 
l ocal s to conduct internal organizing in advance of each contract negotiations 
r egar d l ess of w h et h er an ex t er n al cor p or at e cam p ai gn w as d eem ed ap p r op r i at e. Th e 
m essage t o l ocal s w as t h at by act i v at i n g m em ber s an d ap p l y i n g p r essu r e on t h e 
em p l oy er i n t h e w or k p l ace, the union could increase bargaining leverage. The implicit 
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common thread w as to apply internally a union building approach to mobilizing 
members that paralleled the OI's external organizing philosophy. 
The connecti on among bottom up organi zing, mobilization, and union 
revitalization w as made explicit during a 1988 teleconference on internal organizing 
t h at w as sp o n so r ed b y t h e A FL -CIO and inspired by The Changing Situation. T h e 
m essage h as l i v ed on f or m or e t h an a d ecad e i n " N u m ber s Th at Cou n t ," a summary of 
t h e t el econ f er en ce p u bl i sh ed by t h e A FL -CI O, w h i ch h as been u sed w i d el y by l abor 
educators for training on internal organizing. It w as this manual that first d escribed 
the "organizing model of unionism" and contrasted it to the servicing model (A FL -CIO, 
1988). Under the organizing model, the role of the union is to help workers find 
collective solutions to their work-r el at ed co n cer n s. W h et h er t h e l o cal u n i o n i s seek i n g 
recognition, negotiating a contract, or enforcing the contract, the organizing model 
suggests that the union’s power can be enhanced by organization, activism and 
m i l i t ance by m em ber s i n t he w or k p l ace. The m ost ar d ent m i ssi onar i es f or t he 
organizing model have posited that mobilization of members ultimately wil l reduce 
their reliance on the union for servicing and representational functions and thereby free 
r esou r ces an d st af f f or ot h er p u r su i t s (Ban k s an d M et zg ar , 1989). 
Initial enthusiasm among adventuresome unionists for the organizing model 
u l t i m at el y h as w an ed i n t h e f ace of i n t er n al r esi st an ce. Of f i cer s an d st af f ar e 
com f or t abl e w i t h t hei r t r ad i t i onal r ol es, and m em ber s hav e r esi st ed ef f or t s t o r ed u ce 
ser v i ces an d qu est i on ed ex p en d i t u r es of d u es on ex t er n al or gan i zi n g. Ev en t h ose 
unionists w ho view organizing as the top priority have struggled with the relationship 
bet w een ser v i ci n g an d or gan i zi n g. Som e h av e ar gu ed t h at or gan i zi n g su ccess d ep en d s 
in part on the union’s reputation in servicing; and y et the reality is that the only w ay to 
increase organizing on a significan t scal e i s t o sh i f t r eso u r ces aw ay f r o m ser v i ci n g . 
Most important, mobilization has proven to be harder and more staff-intensive than 
traditional servicing. This has raised concerns about draining already limited resources 
aw ay f r om or gani zi ng. 
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T h ese barriers have l ed many unionists to conclude that the "organizing model" 
vs. "servicing model" debate is no longer productive. Upon reflection, the organizing 
m od el i s n ot a f u l l y d ev el op ed con st r u ct t h at can be ap p r op r i at el y cou n t er p oi sed t o t h e 
en t r en ch ed servicing model. In particular, it fails to elucidate a cl ear path from 
servicing to external organizing. Unionists committed to organizing continue to 
criticize the servicing model, but have shifted their focus to building an "organizing 
culture," or promoting "transformation" to a new style of unionism that aims to increase 
m ar k et sh ar e, t h ou gh i t s p ar t i cu l ar s ar e n ot y et cl ear l y d ef i n ed (Fl et ch er an d H u r d , 
1997; Fl et ch er an d H u r d , 2001). 
Organizing for the Future 
Dissatisfaction with Lane Kirkland ’ s r i sk av er se m an ag em en t o f t h e A FL -CIO 
grew as it became clear that the Clinton administration w as not likely to expedite 
labor’s renewal. Impatient with the federation’s inertia and public image, several 
national union presidents began to discuss the n eed f or n ew l ead er sh i p . I n t h e 
af t er m at h of t h e N ov em ber 1994 el ect i on d ef eat of t h e D em ocr at i c Con gr ess an d t h e 
concomitant deathblow to labor’s political agenda, the revolt w ent public. 
W h en ef f or t s t o or ch est r at e a p eacef u l t r an sf er of p ow er f ai l ed , Kirkland’s 
d et r act or s an n ou n ced t h at t h ey w ou l d m ou n t a ch al l en ge at t h e Oct ober 1995 A FL -CIO 
convention. John Sw eeney, President of SEIU (the federation’s fasting growing 
af f i l i at e) h ead ed t h e sl at e of ch al l en ger s. W h en i t becam e cl ear t h at h e cou l d n ot win 
K i r k l an d st ep p ed asi d e an d en d or sed D on ah u e. I n t h e f i r st con t est ed el ect i on f or 
Pr esi d en t of t h e A FL -CI O t h e d ebat e cen t er ed on t h e r ol e of t h e f ed er at i on i n 
organizing and the pace of change. At the convention, Sw eeney w as supported by 
enough uni on p r esi d en t s t o assu r e v i ct or y f or h i s sl at e w i t h 56 p er cen t of t h e v ot e. Th e 
n ew of f i cer s assu m ed con t r ol on Oct ober 25, 1995. 
A N ew V oi ce f or A m er i can W or k er s 
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Sw een ey based h i s cam p ai gn on a " N ew V oi ce" p l at f or m t h at p r om i sed t o 
" r eb u i l d t h e A m er i can labor movement." The first priority w as to establish for the 
f ed er at i on a l ead er sh i p r ol e i n or gan i zi n g. A n ew Or gan i zi n g D ep ar t m en t w as cr eat ed 
and t he OI 's p r ogr am w as exp and ed w i t h t he goal of r ecr u i t i ng and t r ai ni ng 1000 new 
organizers within two years. The upshot of the primacy afforded to organizing w as an 
effort to establish union growth as the top priority for the labor movement. In this 
regard, the federation’s "Changing to Organize" program prevailed upon national and 
local unions to shift significant r esources from servicing to external organizing. By 
attempting to establish organizing as the top priority the federation in effect signaled its 
intention to lead unions aw ay from their dogged attachment to servicing. 
Although there is no explicit commitment to the organizing model as an 
al t er n at i v e m o d e o f o p er at i o n , t h e A FL -CIO has supplemented its organizing initiatives 
with programs that incorporate mobilization of union members. Labor’s highly visible 
political campaigns in the three national el ect i on s si n ce Sw een ey b ecam e Pr esi d en t , 
have featured an effort to build permanent grassroots organizations of politically active 
u n i on m em ber s acr oss t h e cou n t r y . Th e r en am ed D ep ar t m en t of Fi el d M obi l i za t i on h as 
focused on rejuvenati ng l ocal Labor Councils through its Union Cities initiative, w hich 
h as p r om ot ed m em ber m obi l i za t i on as t h e best h op e f or st i m u l at i n g ex t er n al 
organizing and reviving union political activism at the community level. 
Ultimately, the N ew Voice blueprint called for returning to uni ons the ty pe of 
economic and political power they wielded in the first quarter century after World War 
I I . Par t of t h e p l an t o r ecap t u r e econ om i c p ow er w as a n ew Cen t er f or St r at egi c 
Cam p ai gn s. Th i s cen t er h as sou gh t t o coor d i n at e cor p or at e cam p ai gn activities, to 
p r o m o t e i n t er -union solidarity, and to train union staff in the strategic deployment of 
cor p or at e cam p ai gn t act i cs. 
U n d er Joh n Sw een ey i t i s cl ear t h at st ar t i n g i n l at e 1995 t h e A FL -CIO began to 
contest the dinosaur image with new vigor. On the surface the components of the new 
initiatives look a lot like the plan spelled out in the Changing Situation i n 1985. Bu t 
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t h er e h av e b een t w o n ot ab l e d i f f er en ces: t h e A FL -CIO has attempted to take a much 
m or e aggr essi v e l ead er sh i p r ol e, an d si gn i f i can t r esou r ces h av e been d ev ot ed t o t h e 
ef f or t . W h at ev er t h e en d r esu l t , an i m m ed i at e ben ef i t of t h e f l u r r y of act i v i t y h as been 
increased visibility for unions. From a public relations perspective, the heightened 
activity of the A FL-CIO, and the w illi n g n ess o f Sw een ey t o cr i ss-cross the country to 
ap p ear i n su p p or t of u n i on cau ses h av e ach i ev ed a r em ar k abl e t u r n ar ou n d i n t h e 
am ou n t an d t on e of n ew s cov er age af f or d ed t o t h e l abor m ov em en t . Ev en af t er m or e 
than five y ear s, though, it is still not cl ear w h et h er su b st an t i v e r esu l t s w i l l ev er m at ch 
t h e an t i ci p at i on gen er at ed by t h e " N ew V oi ce" agen d a. 
Th e St at e of t h e D i n osau r , 2001 
W i t h u ni ons r ep r esent i ng onl y 9% of t he p r i v at e sect or w or k f or ce, i t i s cl ear t hat 
to avoid being marginalized the labor mov em en t m u st u n d er t ak e r ad i cal 
transformation. John Sw eeney and his progressive staff at the AFL-C I O h av e w o r k ed 
t i r el essl y f or ov er f i v e y ear s t o r ep osi t i on t he f ed er at i on i n or d er t o l ead t he 
revitalization effort. Unfortunately, changes at the center ar e i n su f f i ci en t t o assu r e 
m et am or p h osi s t h r ou gh ou t t h e m ov em en t . Becau se of t h e d ecen t r al i zed st r u ct u r e of 
labor in the U.S., the k ey to success lies in the national unions and their local s. 
A lthough w ith its new aggressiveness the A FL-C I O m ay ser v e as a cat al y st , l ast i n g 
ch an ge u l t i m at el y d ep en d s on el ect ed l ead er s an d st af f , m an y of w h om ar e w ed d ed t o 
the old model. The servicing magnet is powerful, especially at the local level. Freeing 
resources for organizing and other initiatives is no easy task. 
In this context, the impact of the new Organizing Department has largely been 
limited to establishing organizing as a priority. The A FL-CIO Executive Council lent 
specificity to this objective in August 2000 when it set a formal target to organize 
1,000,000 w or k er s a y ear (A FL -CI O , 2001: 3) . H ow ev er , ef f or t s t o ex t en d t h e 
f ed er at i on 's i n f l u en ce r egar d i n g or gan i zi n g st r at egy an d t act i cs h av e been l ar gel y 
r ebu f f ed by af f i l i at es d et er m i ned t o p u r su e t hei r ow n agend as. U l t i m at el y , t he A FL -
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CIO has chosen to back off, revising its organizing objectives to fit the reality. Its 1998 
program summary spoke of "leading" the change to organize and "sponsoring strategic 
or gan i zi n g cam p ai gn s" (A FL -CI O, 1998: 7). By con t r ast , t h e 2001 p r ogr am em p h asi zes 
"helping affiliate unions" with organizing and "providing strategic r esearch and other 
assi st an ce" ( A FL -CI O, 2001: 3). 
Virtually al l national union presidents have endorsed the organizing priority, 
w i t h i n cr eased b u d g et s an d st af f acr oss t h e l ab or m ov em en t . A n u m ber of unions have 
been particularly aggressive, most notably the SEIU which now allocates 50% of its 
n at i on al bu d get t o or gan i zi n g an d r ep or t ed t h at i t ad d ed 70,000 n ew m em ber s i n 2000. 
Th er e h av e been a n u m ber of h i gh l y v i si bl e v i ct or i es by ot h er u n i on s as well, including 
a u n i t of 37,000 Pu er t o Ri can ed u cat i on em p l oy ees or gan i zed by t h e A FT an d a 
su ccessf u l CW A cam p ai g n t o r ep r esen t 9,500 U SA i r w ay s p assen g er ser v i ce 
p r of essi on al s. Bu t t h e A FL -CI O conf i r m s t hat t en of i t s 66 af f i l i at ed u ni ons accou nt f or 
80% of the organizing. In spite of the increased efforts, unions are not recruiting 
en ou gh n ew m em ber s t o cou n t er act l osses d u e t o cl osu r es an d em p l oy m en t cu t s i n 
u n i on i zed w or k p l aces, so t h at u n i on m em ber sh i p f el l by 200,000 l ast y ear (Gr een h ou se, 
2001). 
A FL -CI O ef f or t s t o en h an ce bar gai n i n g st r en gt h h av e f ar ed n o bet t er , w h er e t h e 
Corporate Affairs Department's efforts to influence national union strategy have not y et 
taken root. By contrast, the Field Mobilization Department has made substantial 
progress in its campaigns to revitalize Central Labor Councils, the multi-union local 
b o d i es o f t h e A F L -CIO. M uch of the success in building activism at the local level can 
be at t r i bu t ed t o t he d ep ar t m ent 's U ni on Ci t i es p r ogr am w hi ch encou r ages l abor 
cou n ci l s t o est ab l i sh m u l t i -faceted programs d esigned to build local coalitions, increase 
p ol i t i cal i n f l u en ce, p r om ot e w or k er ed u cat i on an d en gage m em ber s i n " st r eet h eat " 
ev en t s t h at l en d su p p or t t o l ocal st r u ggl es (L azar ov i ci , 2001). 
Th e m ost com p el l i n g ev i d en ce t h at som e t y p e of r esu r gen ce m ay be at h an d 
comes from the political arena. In contrast to organizing, the Sw eeney administration's 
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efforts to centralize control of political strategy have been supported broadly. This role 
is more consistent with the accep t ed f u n ct i on of t h e f ed er at i on , an d l ess t h r eat en i n g t o 
national unions' traditional prerogatives. With the help of a roughly $40 millions 
special combined contribution from the national unions in each of the three most recent 
el ect i on y ear s (1996, 1998, 2000), t h e A FL -C I O h as g r eat l y ex p an d ed i t s g r assr o o t s 
mobilization effort. N etw orks of thousands of union volunteer s have been set up in 
targeted Congressional districts across the country. In the 2000 el ection "AFL-CIO 
members handed out 14 million leaflets at worksites, mailed out 12 million pieces of 
cam p ai gn l i t er at u r e, and m ad e 8 m i l l i on p hone cal l s" (H of f m an, 2000). 
A s a direct r esult of this activity, union member participation in el ections has 
i n cr eased d r am at i cal l y . I n 1992, 19% of v ot er s w er e f r om u n i on h ou seh ol d s; by 2000 
this had increased to 26%. Unions are widely credited with Al Gore's popular "victory" 
and his ability to carry several key states, including Michigan, Wisconsin and 
M i n n esot a. Th e r ed u ced , v er y t h i n Rep u bl i can m ar gi n i n t h e H ou se of Rep r esen t at i v es 
as well as the even split in the Senate would likely not have occurred without labor's 
f i el d op er at i on (H of f m an , 2000). 
But the increased effectiveness of labor's political activities has not r esulted in 
major i mprovements legislatively, and now there is a hostile President w ho opposes 
near l y ev er y asp ect of t he u ni on p ol i cy agend a. The p r om i se f or t he f u t u r e l i es i n t he 
demonstrated ability to mobilize at the grassroots. But there are recent signs that 
national unions are breaking ranks and pursuing narrow sel f interest. The USWA 
joined with the steel industry to persuade the Bush administration to r estrict imports, 
an d ev en h i n t ed at a p ossi bl e en d or sem en t f or h i s r eel ect i on i n 2004 (M u r r ay ). Th e 
U M W A h as p r ai sed t h e p resident's energy policy, particularly his promotion of 
i n cr eased coal p r od u ct i on ( Gr een h ou se, 2001B) . O t h er u n i on s h av e r each ed 
comparable accommodations, but these tw o unions are particularly notew orthy 
b ecau se t h ey h av e b een st r on g su p p or t er s of Joh n Sw een ey . 
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Ti e t o t h ese p ol i t i cal d ef ect i on s t h e d ep ar t u r e f r om t h e A FL -CIO of the 
Car p en t er s u n i on i n M ar ch 2001, an d i t ap p ear s t h at l abor i s m ov i n g d an ger ou sl y 
towards fragmentation. On the other hand there are definite signs of strength in the 
political and organizing arenas, and unionization in the public sector remains strong 
w i t h d en si t y ov er 38%. Th e st or y of l abor 's ef f or t s at r en ew al i s cl ear l y u n f i n i sh ed . Th e 
d i n osau r h as been m or e act i v e i n t h e Sw een ey er a, bu t m em ber sh i p ov er al l con t i n u es t o 
dwindle and there are indications of trouble on the horizon. The struggle continues, 
and in spite of grow ing skepticism, extinction is not inevitable. 
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